Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984) by Shapiro, David M.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 12 | Issue 3 Article 6
Fall 1984
Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis, 451
So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984)
David M. Shapiro
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
David M. Shapiro, Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984), 12 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 669 (2017) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol12/iss3/6
CASENOTE
Torts/Evidence-SEAT BELT DEFENSE-WHETHER THEY KNOW IT
OR NOT, FLORIDA MOTORISTS MUST "BUCKLE UP" OR RISK Loss OF
FULL RECOVERY-Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis,
451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis,1 the Florida
Supreme Court reversed the Fourth District Court of Appeal' and
held that evidence of nonuse of an available seat belt may be con-
sidered by the jury in assessing damages when it is shown that fail-
ure to use the seat belt contributed substantially to at least a por-
tion of the plaintiff's injuries.3 In accepting the "seat belt
defense,"4 the supreme court departed from prior Florida law5 and
joined the minority of jurisdictions which recognize the doctrine.'
Because of the vast number of motorists that travel Florida high-
ways, the ramifications of this decision are broad. The Florida
driver now has a duty imposed by judicial fiat that requires him to
predict and decide whether "buckling up" will increase or mitigate
damages resulting from an automobile accident.7
The purposes of this note are threefold. First, it will examine the
origin of the seat belt defense and highlight the theories which
have been advanced in favor of the defense. The judicial responses
to these theories will be explored in an effort to outline the general
principles of the doctrine, and case law prior to Pasakarnis will be
discussed to expose the quandary which has engrossed this area of
1. 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984).
2. Insurance Co. of N. America v. Pasakarnis, 425 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
3. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 449.
4. Some commentators have used the phrase "seat belt rule" as distinguished from "seat
belt defense." Although the term "defense" has the connotation of a total bar to recovery,
the author will use the term "seat belt defense" for the sake of uniformity. See Hoglund &
Parsons, Caveat Viator: The Duty To Wear Seat Belts Under Comparative Negligence
Law, 50 WASH. L. REV. 1, 8 n.25 (1974).
5. Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966) (court refused to permit defen-
dant automobile owner to offer evidence of plaintiff's failure to use seat belt).
6. See cases cited infra note 37.
7. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 454. The choice still rests with the motorist, because the
supreme court did not impose an absolute duty to wear seat belts. The court held: "Nonuse
of the seat belt may or may not amount to a failure to use reasonable care on the part of the
plaintiff. Whether it does depends on the particular circumstances of the case." Id.
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the law. Second, the development of Pasakarnis and Allstate In-
surance Co. v. Lafferty,' a companion case, will be traced from the
trial court level to the Florida Supreme Court. Finally, the su-
preme court's decision to adopt the seat belt defense will be ques-
tioned, with a suggestion for the possible contours of a legislative
response.
II. THEORIES BEHIND THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE
In the mid-1950's, the Ford Motor Company launched a national
safety campaign that included the promotion of vehicular safety
through the installation of lap belts.9 Shortly thereafter, state leg-
islatures in the early 1960's began to require the installation of
front seat lap belts in all new automobiles. 10 The federal govern-
ment mandated the installation of front seat shoulder harnesses in
cars manufactured after January 1, 1968.11
Promotion of the installation of seat belts spawned the emer-
gence of the "seat belt defense." Defense counsel have advanced
three theories to justify adoption of the doctrine by the courts:
(1) A plaintiff's failure to wear an available seat belt, coupled
with state and federal installation requirements, constitutes negli-
gence per se completely barring the plaintiff's recovery.
(2) A plaintiffs failure to make use of an available seat belt is
a breach of his duty to act reasonably under the circumstances
and therefore constitutes contributory negligence.
(3) If a plaintiff fails to fasten his seat belt, he may be found
to have acted unreasonably and in disregard of his own best inter-
est, and should not be allowed to recover damages for injuries
which he could have avoided."
The third theory, known as the mitigation of damages theory, was
accepted by the Florida Supreme Court in Pasakarnis as a viable
means to adopt the seat belt defense. 3
8. 451 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1984).
9. See 16 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Seat Belt Accidents § 2, at 354 (1965).
10. See Kircher, The Seat Belt Defense-State of the Law, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 172, 174
(1970).
11. See 23 C.F.R. § 255.21 (1968). The current federal motor vehicle safety standard for
occupant crash protection (Standard No. 208) is codified at 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1983).
12. Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167 (N.Y. 1974). See generally Comment, The Med-
ical and Legal Problems Arising from the Failure To Wear Seat Belts, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV.
130 (1972).
13. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 454.
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A. Negligence Per Se
Negligence per se is defined as conduct which is considered neg-
ligent regardless of the circumstances, "either because it is in viola-
tion of a statute or valid municipal ordinance, or because it is so
palpably opposed to the dictates of common prudence that it can
be said without hesitation or doubt that no careful person would
have been guilty of it."' '4 Courts, however, are reluctant to find
negligence per se absent a clear violation of statute or ordinance. 15
Because nonuse of a seat belt is not a direct violation of state or
federal seat belt laws, the negligence per se theory has been uni-
formly rejected by the courts. Although state and federal statutes
have required the installation of seat belts, use of seat belts has
generally not been mandated.' 6
The consensus of the courts has been that "the seat belt enact-
ments are not absolute safety measures and. . . no statutory duty
to use the belts can be implied from them.' 7 The Wisconsin Su-
preme Court asserted that a statute "which does not require by its
terms the use of seat belts, cannot be considered a safety statute in
a sense that it is negligence per se for an occupant of an automo-
bile to fail to use available seat belts."' 8 New York recently passed
a law requiring the use of seat belts.'9 The statute provides that
evidence of seat belt nonuse can be introduced to reduce damages
as determined by the jury, but may not be considered in regard to
the issue of liability.2" This would appear to preclude the possibil-
ity that nonuse of a seat belt in New York will constitute negli-
gence per se.
Some early cases in the trial courts of several states seemed to
indicate that the negligence per se theory might be accepted as a
basis for the seat belt defense. For example, in Stockinger v.
Dunisch," a Wisconsin trial judge interpreted a state statute re-
14. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 933 (5th ed. 1979).
15. See Kircher, supra note 10, at 174-75; Note, The Seat Belt Defense: A Comprehen-
sive Guide for the Trial Lawyer and Suggested Approach for the Courts, 56 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 272, 278 (1980).
16. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 453. But see infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
17. Miller v. Miller, 160 S.E.2d 65, 68 (N.C. 1968).
18. Bentzler v. Braun, 149 N.W.2d 626, 639 (Wis. 1967).
19. Automobile Seat Belt Law, ch. 365, 1984 N.Y. Sess. Law News 689 (McKinney).
20. Id. § 1, 1984 N.Y. Sess. Law News at 689-90 (evidence of nonuse of seat belts inad-
missible on issue of liability but may be admissible on issue of mitigation of damages).
21. (Wis. Cir. Ct. Sheboygan County 1964), noted in 5 FOR THE DEF. 79 (1964); see also
Kleist, The Seat Belt Defense-An Exercise in Sophistry, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 613, 614 n.3
(1967).
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quiring installation of seat belts to implicitly require occupants to
use them. Although the court did not rule that failure to use a seat
belt was negligence per se, it did hold there was an implied duty to
use the seat belt.22 Despite initial successes at the trial level, how-
ever, the majority of appellate courts have refused to admit evi-
dence of seat belt nonuse under the negligence per se or any other
theory.23
B. Contributory Negligence or Comparative Negligence
Under the second theory defendants seek to admit evidence of
seat belt nonuse to show that the plaintiff was contributorily negli-
gent because he failed to exercise the common law duty of ordinary
care. The majority of courts have rejected this argument, reasoning
that contributory negligence is applicable only when the plaintiff's
failure to use due care has caused the accident in whole or in part,
not when it has merely exacerbated the injuries.2"' Commentators
have speculated that the courts made this distinction between acci-
dent and injury to avoid a total bar to the plaintiff's recovery, a
characteristic of the doctrine of contributory negligence. 5
In jurisdictions governed by the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence, the courts have sharply disagreed as to the propriety of the
seat belt defense.2" Because comparative negligence is geared to-
ward apportioning damages between parties based on their degree
of fault,2 7 some courts have placed less emphasis on the distinction
22. 5 FOR THE DEF. 79 (1964).
23. See Seese v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 648 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1981) (applying North Car-
olina law); Petersen v. Klos, 426 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970) (applying Mississippi law); Britton
v. Doehring, 242 So. 2d 666 (Ala. 1970); Churning v. Staples, 628 P.2d 180 (Colo. Ct. App.
1981); Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967); Brown v. Kendrick, 192
So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966); Kevanagh v. Butorac, 221 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. Ct. App. 1966);
Taplin v. Clark, 626 P.2d 1198 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); Romankewiz v. Black, 167 N.W.2d 606
(Mich. Ct. App. 1969); Kapischke v. First Continental Corp., 610 P.2d 668 (Mont. 1980);
Miller v. Miller, 160 S.E.2d 65 (N.C. 1968); Amend v. Bell, 570 P.2d 138 (Wash. 1977).
24. Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E.2d 164, 168 (N.Y. 1974).
25. See Note, Buckling Up for Safety: Should Florida Reconsider the Seat Belt De-
fense?, 13 STETSON L. REV. 160, 163 (1983); Comment, The Seat Belt Defense-A Valid
Instrument of Public Policy, 44 TENN. L. REV. 119, 124 (1976).
26. Miller v. Miller, 160 S.E.2d 65 (N.C. 1968) (disallowed evidence of seat belt nonuse);
Amend v. Bell, 570 P.2d 138 (Wash. 1977) (disallowed evidence of seat belt nonuse); Bent-
zler v. Braun, 149 N.W.2d 626 (Wis. 1967) (allowed evidence of seat belt nonuse).
27. Comparative negligence jurisdictions fall into one of three basic categories: pure,
modified, or slight-gross. Under pure comparative negligence the plaintiff's damages are re-
duced in proportion to the amount of his contributing negligence. The modified form has
two variations: "equal to or greater than" and "not greater than." Under the "equal to or
greater than" variation, the plaintiff cannot recover damages if his negligence equalled or
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between the cause of the injury and the cause of the accident.2 It
is speculated that the courts no longer have to make this distinc-
tion to avoid a complete bar to recovery.29
Addressing the issue of negligence, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held "that there is a duty, based on a common law standard
of ordinary care, to use available seat belts independent of any
statutory mandate. '30 The North Carolina Supreme Court voiced a
different opinion, asserting that " '[t]he social utility of wearing a
seat belt must be established in the mind of the public before fail-
ure to use a seat belt can be held to be negligence.' ",31 Otherwise,
the court would be imposing a standard of conduct rather than ap-
plying a standard already accepted by society.3 2
In Amend v. Bell,3 3 the defendant argued that the doctrine of
comparative negligence dictated that evidence revealing the plain-
tiff's failure to use his seat belt be allowed. The Washington Su-
preme Court, however, saw little significance in the adoption of the
doctrine of comparative negligence regarding the seat belt defense.
The court reasoned: "While the result of contributory negligence
and comparative negligence is much different, both are premised
upon negligence. In the one case we bar recovery, in the other we
surpassed that of the defendant. Under the "not greater than" formula the plaintiff can
recover damages if the plaintiff's negligence was less than or equal to that of the defendant.
Under either variation, the damages are reduced in proportion to the plaintiff's fault. The
slight-gross approach allows the plaintiff to recover only if the plaintiff's negligence is slight
and the defendant's is gross comparatively; otherwise the plaintiff's contributory negligence
bars his recovery. As noted earlier, Florida has adopted pure comparative negligence. See
generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 67, at 471-74 (5th ed. 1984).
As of 1979, comparative negligence had been adopted in 34 states. See Placek v. Sterling
Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511, 515 (Mich. 1979). These states include Alaska, Arkansas, Califor-
nia, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
28. See, e.g., Bentzler, 149 N.W.2d at 640.
29. Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 4, at 14.
30. Bentzler, 149 N.W.2d at 639. Despite the court's finding that the plaintiff had a duty
to wear a seat belt, the plaintiff's recovery was not reduced because there was insufficient
proof; no expert testimony was presented on the probable effect of wearing the seat belt,
and the driver, who had also failed to wear his seat belt, suffered only minor injuries. The
court nevertheless concluded that "in those cases where seat belts are available and there is
evidence before the jury indicating causal relationship between the injuries sustained and
the failure to use seat belts, it is proper and necessary to instruct the jury in that regard."
Id. at 640.
31. Miller, 160 S.E.2d at 69 (quoting Note, Seat Belt Negligence in Automobile Acci-
dents, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 288, 297).
32. Note, supra note 31, at 297.
33. 570 P.2d 138 (Wash. 1977).
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compare negligence and potentially reduce damages. However, in
either case, we look to the negligence of the plaintiff. '34 Conse-
quently, the court determined that evidence of seat belt nonuse
was inadmissible.
C. Mitigation of Damages or Avoidable Consequences
The third argument advanced by the defendants to admit evi-
dence of seat belt nonuse focuses on the doctrines of avoidable
consequences35 and mitigation of damages.36 These theories have
met with greater success than the negligence per se or contribu-
tory/comparative negligence theories. 7 Both doctrines are consid-
ered similar and are directed toward the issue of damages rather
than the issue of liability.3 8 Furthermore, both doctrines are based
on the notion that recovery should be denied for those damages
that could have been avoided by reasonable conduct of the
plaintiff.3 9
Traditionally, these doctrines have been used only with refer-
ence to post-accident conduct;40 it has been argued that to impose
a preaccident duty forces the plaintiff to anticipate the negligence
of others.4" A counterargument is that the availability of seat belts
is a unique situation which allows the plaintiff to minimize his
damages prior to an accident.4 This contention, however, has had
limited success. In Britton v. Doehring,4 3 the Alabama Supreme
34. Id. at 143.
35. The doctrine of avoidable consequences is a rule which precludes recovery by the
plaintiff for any damages which could have been avoided by reasonable conduct. W. PRos-
SER & W. KEETON, supra note 27, § 65, at 458.
36. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 904 (5th ed. 1979) defines mitigation of damages as the
imposition of a duty on an injured party to exercise reasonable diligence and ordinary care
in attempting to minimize his damages after injury has been inflicted. Both mitigation of
damages and avoidable consequences are affirmative defenses.
37. The following cases, each representative of its jurisdiction, have permitted presenta-
tion of the defense: Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va.
1978) (applying Virginia law); Benner v. Interstate Container Corp., 73 F.R.D. 502 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (applying Pennsylvania law); Pritts v. Walter Lowery Trucking Co., 400 F. Supp. 867
(W.D. Pa. 1975) (applying Pennsylvania law); Truman v. Vargas, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373 (Ct. App.
1969); Remington v. Arndt, 259 A.2d 145 (Conn. 1969); Durlanas v. Plate, 358 N.E.2d 916
(Ill. App. Ct. 1976); Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 1974); Sams v. Sams, 148 S.E.2d
154 (S.C. 1966); Bentzler v. Braun, 149 N.W.2d 626 (Wis. 1967).
38. See Spier, 323 N.E.2d at 168.
39. See Note, supra note 15, at 285.
40. Lafferty v. Allstate Ins. Co., 425 So. 2d 1147, 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev'd, 451
So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984); Kleist, supra note 21, at 620-21.
41. Kleist, supra note 21, at 615-16.
42. Spier, 323 N.E.2d at 168.
43. 242 So. 2d 666, 671 (Ala. 1970).
SEAT BELT DEFENSE
Court rejected the doctrine of avoidable consequences in the con-
text of seat belt nonuse. The court noted that Alabama was a con-
tributory negligence jurisdiction and reasoned that to allow the
seat belt defense to mitigate the damages would permit the jury to
apportion the damages and effectively adopt comparative negli-
gence.44 The court further determined that the jury members
would have to enter a "realm of speculation and conjecture" which
is inappropriate for their consideration. 45 Moreover, the court con-
cluded that if a duty were to be imposed on the motorist to wear
seat belts, it should be done by the state legislature.4 6
Some courts have been more receptive to the avoidable conse-
quences argument. In Spier v. Barker7 the New York Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the trial court's ruling allowing use of the seat belt
defense on the premise that one has a duty to take precaution
against foreseeable injury. 48 The plaintiff in Spier was injured
when her car was hit by defendant's truck, 9 causing the plaintiff
to be ejected from her automobile and sustain serious injuries.50 An
expert in accident reconstruction testified at trial that had the
plaintiff been wearing her seat belt, she would have sustained only
minor injuries." The judge instructed the jury members that if
they found that a reasonably prudent driver would have used a
seat belt, and that the plaintiff would not have received some or all
of her injuries if she had used it, then they could only award dam-
ages for those injuries that could not have been prevented by using
the belt.52 At that time, New York adhered to the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence, but the court avoided totally barring recovery
through utilizing the doctrine of avoidable consequences.
The majority of jurisdictions have not accepted the rationale set
out in Spier.53 In rejecting the seat belt defense, the courts have
44. Id. at 675.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 323 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 1974).
48. Id. at 166.
49. Id. at 165.
50. Id. at 169.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 166.
53. Britton v. Doehring, 242 So. 2d 666 (Ala. 1970); Nash v. Kamrath, 521 P.2d 161
(Ariz. 1974); Hotchkiss v. Preble, 521 P.2d 1278 (Colo. 1974); Fisher v. Moore, 517 P.2d 458
(Colo. 1973); Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967); McCord v. Green,
362 A.2d 720 (D.C. 1976); Hampton v. State Highway Comm'n, 498 P.2d 236 (Kan. 1972);
Placek v. Sterling Heights, 217 N.W.2d 900 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974); Romankewiz v. Black,
167 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969); Miller v. Harper, 454 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984]
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grappled with a number of concerns. When determining unreason-
able conduct, courts have considered that only approximately four-
teen percent of the population uses seat belts. 4 Although a cus-
tomary standard of conduct is not necessarily always a reasonable
standard,55 the low percentage of users may indicate that the effec-
tiveness of seat belts is not yet established in the minds of
motorists.56
Proponents of the seat belt defense advance the following test to
determine the reasonableness of a plaintiff's conduct:
(1) the unreasonableness of the risk to which plaintiff has ex-
posed himself, as determined by
(2) weighing the importance of the interest to be protected
against
(3) the probable gravity of anticipated harm to himself.57
Similarly, the test set out by Judge Learned Hand in United
States v. Carroll Towing Co." has been suggested by proponents
of the seat belt defense to determine unreasonable behavior. In
Carroll Towing, the formula for liability was whether the burden
of adequate precautions against harm was less than the probability
of harm multiplied by the gravity of the resulting injury.59
Although the number of accidents that occur are substantial,
that number is relatively small in relation to the amount of vehi-
cles travelling the highways.6 0 Most individuals reach their destina-
tion without an accident. Moreover, the average motorist does not
anticipate harm to himself when he enters his automobile in-
1970); Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 544 P.2d 719 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975); Miller v.
Miller, 160 S.E.2d 65 (N.C. 1968); Roberts v. Bohn, 269 N.E.2d 53 (Ohio Ct. App.), rev'd on
other grounds, 279 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio 1971); Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d
48 (Okla. 1976); Amend v. Bell, 570 P.2d 138 (Wash. 1977).
54. See Insurance Co. of N. America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 455 n.3 (Fla. 1984)
(Shaw, J., dissenting).
55. See, e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.) (opinion of L. Hand, J.) (emphasiz-
ing that some safety precautions are so imperative that even their universal disregard will
not excuse their omission), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
56. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 455 n.3 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
57. Note, Reallocating the Risk of Loss in Automobile Accidents by Means of
Mandatory Seat Belt Use Legislation, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 91, 115 (1978) (citing W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 419 (4th ed. 1971)).
58. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
59. Id. at 173.
60. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, TRAFFIC ACCIDENT
FACTS 31 (1981).
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tending to drive lawfully. The court in Miller v. Miller6 1 found
merit in this contention and asserted: "In spite of the well known
hazards of highway travel, . . . most motorists do arrive safely at
their destinations. . . . [The average person] believes that the
chance of being involved in an injury-producing accident is rela-
tively low.""2 Accordingly, courts have expressed doubt as to
whether the plaintiff has exposed himself to an unreasonable risk
by not fastening his seat belt.
Although the burden of buckling one's seat belt appears to be
slight, the burden becomes greater due to the frequency with
which it must be done. Questions remain as to whether fastening
the seat belt is at such a level of consciousness in most people as to
label the burden as slight."3
Additionally, the possibility of enhanced injuries as a result of
the motorist fastening the seat belt cannot be ignored when deter-
mining reasonable behavior. Although there has been a plethora of
literature advocating the effectiveness of the seat belt in reducing
injuries, 4 there has also been some evidence to the contrary and
instances where wearing seat belts may actually have exacerbated
the injuries."5 Consequently, it would be difficult to calculate in ad-
vance the probable gravity of harm when the motorist does not use
his seat belt since the outcome is pure speculation.
61. 160 S.E.2d 65 (N.C. 1968).
62. Id. at 68 (citation omitted).
63. Courts have hinted that if a situation were to arise that would call the seat belt to an
occupant's attention, then evidence of seat belt nonuse should be allowed. The court in
Miller stated in dicta:
Conceivably a situation could arise in which a plaintiff's failure to have his seat
belt buckled at the time he was injured would constitute negligence. It would,
however, have to be a situation in which the plaintiff, with prior knowledge of a
specific hazard-one not generally associated with highway travel and one from
which a seat belt would have protected him-had failed or refused to fasten his
seat belt.
Id. at 70.
Similarly, in Remington v. Arndt, 259 A.2d 145 (Conn. 1969), the court noted that a situa-
tion may arise in which the circumstances are such as to require a passenger to anticipate a
collision or other mishap and fasten his seat belt. Id. at 146. These situations have been
characterized as the "exceptional circumstances" theory. See Note, supra note 15, at 278-79.
64. See Brief of Petitioner on the Merits at 9, Insurance Co. of N. America v.
Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984).
65. See, e.g., McLeod v. American Motors Corp., 723 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1984) (testi-
mony of expert witness that plaintiff's injuries would have been more serious had she been
wearing a seat belt); 2 FORENSIC MEDICINE: A STUDY IN TRAUMA AND ENVIRONMENTAL
HAZARDS 856-57 (C. Tedeschi, W. Eckert & L. Tedeschi ed. 1977) (discussion and graphic
illustration of situations in which serious or fatal injury may be received from wearing a seat
belt).
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Another basis for rejection of the seat belt defense has been the
notion that "the defendant takes the plaintiff as he finds him.""6
One commentator has noted that if the courts ignore this principle,
it will be difficult to determine how far a motorist must go to miti-
gate his damages.17 For example, the commentator compared the
use of door locks with the use of seat belts. Both are standard
safety equipment in automobiles. The commentator relied on evi-
dence indicating use of door locks may reduce personal injuries in
accidents and questioned why door lock use was not also relevant
and admissible to mitigate a plaintiff's damages.6 8
Another concern expressed by the courts is whether acceptance
of the seat belt defense will actually encourage seat belt use.6 9 It is
highly questionable that a change in common law liability rules
will have a substantial effect on the conduct of the populace, as the
average motorist is either unaware or inadequately informed of
current case law. Consequently, only those individuals who have
been involved in auto accident litigation will be likely to adjust
their behavior. Moreover, if motorists are reluctant to buckle up
for their safety, it is unlikely that they will buckle up for recovery
in a possible lawsuit.
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Miller v. Miller71 was not
convinced that the seat belt defense would modify public behavior.
The court quoted a Colorado law review article which asserted:
"'[Ilmposing an affirmative legal duty of wearing seat belts will
have virtually no effect on the actual seat-belt wearing habits of
automobile occupants. Its only effect would be to give an admitted
wrongdoer a chance to dodge a substantial portion of his
liability.' "72
The common thread in many of the cases rejecting the seat belt
66. Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914, 918 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967).
67. See Comment, supra note 12, at 136.
68. Id. at 137. "Unfortunately, most people do not lock their car doors from the in-
side-a simple procedure that would help prevent the doors from being unlatched in roll-
over or side-impact accidents-and so fail to take full advantage of improvements on doors
and related components." Id. The author noted that "there is apparently no duty imposed
on a vehicle occupant to lock his door from the inside. It is submitted that the failure to use
this safety device, which is readily available to the motorist, constitutes an omission analo-
gous to the failure to fasten one's seat belt." Id.
69. Miller, 160 S.E.2d at 73.
70. See Note, supra note 57, at 117 (author thought it was unduly optimistic to believe
the traditional fault system would have a general deterrent effect on the populace as a
whole).
71. 160 S.E.2d 65 (N.C. 1968).
72. Id. at 73 (quoting 39 U. COLO. L. REV. 605, 608 (1967)).
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defense is the notion that the matter should be left to the legisla-
ture." Several reasons have been offered in support of judicial re-
straint. First, because the legislature has required that seat belts
be installed, the legislature should also be the entity to mandate
their use. 4 Second, inasmuch as the legislature omitted language
requiring their use, it could be argued that the legislature know-
ingly declined to make seat belt use mandatory. 5 It is argued that
this omission should serve as a signal for the exercise of judicial
restraint.7' The majority of courts considering the seat belt defense
have opined that the legislature, rather than the judiciary or the
jury, is the better forum to resolve this complex and conflicting
issue.7
III. FLORIDA DISTRICT COURT REACTION TO THE SEAT BELT
DEFENSE
Prior to Pasakarnis, the leading case in Florida addressing the
seat belt defense was Brown v. Kendrick.78 In Brown, the First
District Court of Appeal subscribed to the notion that the adop-
tion of the seat belt defense was a matter best left to the legisla-
ture.79 Judge Johnson, writing for the court, hinted that some of
the members of the court were convinced that seat belts were ef-
fective safety devices but nevertheless recognized the propriety of
judicial restraint.80
73. Lipscomb, 226 A.2d at 918; Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla. 1st DCA
1966); Barry v. Coca Cola Co., 239 A.2d 273, 278 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967); Robinson
v. Lewis, 457 P.2d 483, 485 (Or. 1969).
74. See, e.g., Romankewiz v. Black, 167 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969).
75. See, e.g., Dillon v. Humphreys, 288 N.Y.S.2d 14 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
76. The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Lafferty v. Allstate Ins. Co., 425 So. 2d 1147
(Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev'd, 451 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1984), took this position. The court as-
serted: "Florida's Legislature has had two decades in which to enact a statute similar to that
enacted in 1971 requiring motorcyle riders to wear helmets." The court reasoned that this
silence on the issue "may be taken as a declaration that the defense is not recognized."
Lafferty, 425 So. 2d at 1149.
77. Robinson, 457 P.2d at 485.
78. 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966). Brown was an action by a minor guest passenger
and her father against the owner of the automobile and the owner's son, who was the driver.
The First District Court of Appeal held that the trial court had not erred in refusing to
admit into evidence the plaintiff's failure to wear an available seat belt. The court noted
that the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt did not cause the accident and that fastening
her belt would not have prevented it. Id. at 50-51.
79. Id. at 51.
80. The court stated: "This is not the law today and it is not within the province of this
court to legislate on the subject, regardless of what might be the thinking of the individual
members of this court." Id.
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The court in Brown was reluctant to get into a debatable side
issue of questionable propriety. "So, in this state of quandary, the
plaintiff and defendant could each have argued on the merits of
the use of seat belts, but each argument would necessarily have
been conjectural and of doubtful propriety.""'
In the cases of Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis8 2
and Lafferty v. Allstate Insurance Co.,"3 the Fourth District Court
of Appeal adhered to the rationale of Brown and rejected the use
of the seat belt defense.
A. Lafferty v. Allstate Insurance Co.
In Lafferty, the plaintiff sustained facial and knee injuries in an
automobile accident." The trial court allowed into evidence expert
testimony that established that Lafferty would not have received
her injuries had she buckled her available seat belt.85 Additionally,
the court instructed the jury that it could consider the testimony
of the expert regarding seat belt nonuse. The jury awarded Laf-
ferty $3,700. The court increased the award by $2,500 on post-trial
motion.86
On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal offered several
reasons for reversing the trial court's decision to permit the in-
struction of the selt belt defense. At the outset, Judge Beranek,
writing for the majority, noted that the legal issue surrounding seat
belt nonuse "is widely debated and inconsistently applied by
courts in current auto accident personal injury litigation."87 The
court also noted that although the sixteen years since Brown v.
Kendrick had seen changes in Florida law,88 the wisdom of Brown
81. Id.
82. 425 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev'd, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984).
83. 425 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev'd, 451 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1984). For a com-
plete discussion of the district court opinion in Lafferty, see Note, supra note 25.
84. Lafferty, 425 So. 2d at 1148.
85. Id.
86. See FLA. STAT. § 768.043 (1983) (damages in personal injury action arising out of
automobile accident subject to increase if court finds the award inadequate-known as
"additur").
87. Lafferty, 425 So. 2d at 1148 (citing Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 9 (1979); Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d
1033 (1977)).
88. The primary change that the court was referring to was the change in Florida from
the doctrine of contributory negligence to comparative negligence. See Hoffman v. Jones,
280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). Prior to the Hoffman decision, the law in Florida was that con-
tributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff was a complete bar to recovery. The Florida
Supreme Court rejected contributory negligence and adopted comparative negligence in
Hoffman. Id. at 438. The comparative negligence doctrine, as adopted in Hoffman, prevents
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was still impressive. 9 The court found particularly persuasive the
argument that the court should let the matter be resolved by the
legislature.90 In support of its position, the court analogized this
situation to the statute requiring use of motorcycle helmets, noting
that this was a similar safety measure which the legislature chose
to address. "[A] jury should not find the existence or nonexistence
of a legal duty to use a [seat] belt based upon such traditionally
legislative materials. Florida's Legislature has had two decades in
which to enact a statute similar to that enacted in 1971 requiring
motorcycle riders to wear helmets."" 1 Hence, the court interpreted
the legislature's silence on the seat belt issue as a declaration that
the seat belt defense is not recognized in Florida.
Focusing its attention on the issue of mitigation of damages, the
court in Lafferty realized that because no Florida case had ruled
on this issue, the court would have to look to other jurisdictions for
guidance.9 2 Moreover, the court recognized the difficulty in resolv-
ing the issue, noting that "[c]ase law from other jurisdictions is
split and respectable judicial reasoning and authority exists on
both sides of the issue." 93
Apparently indicating approval, the court in Lafferty enumer-
ated the reasons for disallowing evidence of seat belt nonuse set
forth in a Washington case, Amend v. Bell:94
(1) [P]laintiff need not predict the defendant's negligence or an-
ticipate an accident; (2) seat belts are not required in all vehicles,
and defendant shouldn't be permitted to take advantage of the
fact that they were installed in plaintiff's vehicle; (3) most people
don't use seat belts, so a jury shouldn't be permitted to find that
they should; and (4) allowing a seat belt defense will produce a
"veritable battle of experts" on the causation question, and spec-
a plaintiff from recovering more than an amount equal to the percentage of damages for
which the defendant was responsible. Id.
89. Lafferty, 425 So. 2d at 1148.
90. The court cited Petersen v. Klos, 426 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), and the reasons set
forth in that opinion for exercising judicial restraint. The court in Peterson noted there was
no consensus as to the utility of seat belts and felt that their usefulness should be estab-
lished in the mind of the public before the courts could hold occupants negligent for not
wearing one. Lafferty, 425 So. 2d at 1148-49.
91. Lafferty, 425 So. 2d at 1149.
92. Id. The court looked to cases from Alabama, Colorado, New Mexico, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Washington.
93. Id. (citing Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 1033 (1977)).
94. 570 P.2d 138 (Wash. 1977). The court noted that the Amend case was also relied on
by the First District Court of Appeal in Selfe v. Smith, 397 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
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ulative verdicts.9 5
The court also noted that because the effectiveness of seat belts is
questionable, a nonuser should not be deemed to have acted
unreasonably.96
The court considered the most compelling reason for disallowing
evidence of seat belt nonuse to be the argument based on the dif-
ference between fault and damages or loss. 7 The court was con-
vinced there was no way to clearly and fairly arrive at a figure de-
termining damages.98 Consequently, the court was troubled by the
possibility that a plaintiff might be limited to recovering only a
fraction of the damages he sustained in an accident which was not
due to any fault on his part. This would result in a windfall for the
negligent tortfeasor.9 9 The court envisioned a situation where an
intoxicated driver could escape liability after colliding with an un-
belted motorist who was stopped at a traffic light."' ° If expert testi-
mony revealed that the motorist would have received no injuries
had he been wearing a seat belt, the jury would have to preclude
any recovery. This would be an unfortunate and unfair result, be-
cause the rule has always been that the lawful driving of a car is
not negligent.101
The most compelling argument advanced by the court was based
upon the simple tort concept that a "tortfeasor takes his plaintiff
as he finds him."1 2 Indeed, the court recognized that admitting
evidence of preaccident conduct would open a Pandora's box.1 03
95. Lafferty, 425 So. 2d at 1149-50 (quoting Selfe, 397 So. 2d at 351 n.8).
96. Lafferty, 425 So. 2d at 1150. The court cited Britton v. Doehring, 242 So. 2d 666
(Ala. 1970), for the proposition that further research needs to be done before it can be
concluded that seat belts are in fact an effective means to prevent injury and death.
97. Lafferty, 425 So. 2d at 1150. The court apparently believed that fault and damages
were distinguishable, but could envision no rational way to assess how much weight to put
on either in calculating plaintiff's recovery. "Should we simply let the jury blend all of the
factors together without being able to even verbalize the logical steps by which they should
arrive at a conclusion?" The court predicted situations in which a plaintiff who was only
20% negligent would receive only 10% of his damages. Id.
98. The court also expressed its concern for the unfairness that might result if the jury
placed too much emphasis on the single fact of seat belt nonuse. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1151.
101. Again, the court offered a persuasive illustration: "People lawfully driving a car on
New Year's Eve probably know there will be drunks on the road but the innocent driver is
not held negligent because he would have been safer at home." Id.
102. Id. at 1150. The court also pointed out that "[m]itigation of damages concerns a
plaintiff's conduct after an accident, not before." Id.
103. Id. at 1150-51.
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The court offered illustrations of potential "evils" which could re-
sult from such a holding:
For example, numerous studies have shown that standard-size
cars are safer than compact or sub-compact cars. Should a plain-
tiff be penalized for not taking this safety factor into considera-
tion when purchasing a car? Further, hard tops are safer than
convertible tops. Is this [fact] for jury consideration and for [the]
court to instruct on? What about evidence demonstrating that
had the convertible top been up rather than down, plaintiff would
not have sustained any injuries?'0 4
The examples are analogous to the question of seat belt nonuse.
All have a bearing on the injuries received in an auto accident, but
none have been considered when determining damages.
Finally, the court opined that the admission of evidence of seat
belt nonuse would place undue emphasis on one evidentiary fact,
which would distract the jury from the main issue of fault for the
accident.105
Judge Hurley dissented, stating that he would have affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.106 Notwithstanding what he considered
to be an attractive argument, he was persuaded by the dissent in
Pasakarnis0 7 and the rationale in Spier v. Barker,08 which al-
lowed evidence of seat belt nonuse. Because different theories were
proposed by those two opinions,' 9 it is unclear which theory Judge
Hurley believed should have been adopted.
B. Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis
The majority of the court in Pasakarnis, unlike Judge Hurley,
found the rationale of Lafferty not only attractive, but persuasive
104. Id. at 1151. The court again emphasized that prior conduct is regulated by the leg-
islature (e.g., driving under the influence laws).
105. Id.
106. Id. (Hurley, J., dissenting).
107. Pasakarnis, 425 So. 2d at 1142 (Schwartz, J., dissenting).
108. 323 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 1974).
109. In Spier, the New York Court of Appeals adopted a theory based on the mitigation
of damages. In his dissenting opinion in Pasakarnis, Judge Schwartz initially advocated that
buckling the seat belt takes minimal effort. Pasakarnis, 425 So. 2d at 1143 (Schwartz, J.,
dissenting). He used Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973), and the adoption of
comparative negligence as the basis for allowing the seat belt defense. Pasakarnis, 425 So.
2d at 1143-44 (Schwartz, J., dissenting). Later in his opinion he apparently rejected the
application of the seat belt defense as negligence per se, stating, "I could not in good con-
science hold that it is necessarily negligent to fail to fasten one's seat belt." Id. at 1146.
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as well." Indicative of the patent uncertainty that surrounds the
seat belt defense, the court had originally formed a majority in
favor of the seat belt defense but subsequently joined the ruling of
their colleagues on the Lafferty court, leaving Judge Schwartz in
"lonely dissent.""'
In Pasakarnis, the litigation stemmed from an accident which
occurred at an intersection when the defendant ran a stop sign.'
Upon collision, the plaintiff, Pasakarnis, was hurled from his jeep,
resulting in a compression type injury of his lower back.
Pasakarnis acknowledged that the jeep was unstable, but deliber-
ately chose not to fasten his seat belt. 13 An expert accident analyst
testified at a deposition that if the plaintiff had buckled his seat
belt, he would not have been thrown from the jeep and would have
received either minor or no injuries."" The trial court, however,
ruled that failure to use the seat belt did not establish a legal basis
to reduce the damage award and refused to submit the expert's
testimony to the jury."5 Consequently, the jury found the defen-
dant 100% at fault and found for Pasakarnis in the amount of
$100,000." 6
Judge Schwartz pointed out in his dissent that adoption of the
comparative negligence doctrine eliminated the harshness of a
complete bar to recovery typical in contributory negligence juris-
dictions.'" Additionally, the comparative negligence formulation
established by Hoffman v. Jones relates to whether any negligence
110. Insurance Co. of N. America v. Pasakarnis, 425 So. 2d 1141, 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA
1982), rev'd, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984).
111. Pasakarnis, 425 So. 2d at 1142 n.1 (Schwartz, J., dissenting). Judge Schwartz set
the tone early when he stated:
[Ilt seems clear to me that the failure to expend the minimal effort required to
fasten an available safety device which has been put there specifically in order to
reduce or avoid injuries from a subsequent accident is, on the very face of the
matter, obviously pertinent and thus should be deemed admissible in an action for
damages, part of which would not have been sustained if the seat belt had been
used.
Id. at 1143.
112. Id. at 1142.
113. Id. The supreme court conceivably could have avoided adopting the seat belt de-
fense and ruled that evidence of seat belt nonuse was admissible in this case as an "excep-
tional circumstance." See supra note 63. The fact that the jeep was known to be unstable
may have required the occupant to use his seat belt in order to avoid a comparative negli-
gence counterclaim.
114. Pasakarnis, 425 So. 2d at 1142 (Schwartz, J., dissenting).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1143.
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of the plaintiff was a legal cause of his "damages," "loss," or "in-
jury," not of the accident. '18 Rejecting the argument calling for ju-
dicial restraint, Judge Schwartz interpreted the legislature's silence
as inconclusive."" Further, he cautioned that judicial inaction, cou-
pled with the absence of a statute, will be interpreted to mean that
an available seat belt did not have to be fastened. 2 '
To Judge Schwartz, the issue of seat belt nonuse would be a fac-
tual matter to be determined by the jury.' He analogized the jury
to a mini-legislature, in which the members would determine
whether a reasonable person should have fastened his seat belt.'22
Judge Schwartz reemphasized that the seat belt defense would
reach the jury only when there was competent evidence indicating
that the plaintiff's nonuse of a seat belt had caused the plaintiff's
injuries. '
IV. Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis-THE "SEAT
BELT DEFENSE" IN THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
The Florida Supreme Court reviewed this matter of great public
importance in an effort to resolve the legal quagmire. Pasakarnis
and Lafferty provided the vehicles by which the supreme court
could determine whether Florida courts should "consider seat belt
evidence as bearing on comparative negligence or mitigation of
damages. "124
Although the rationale of the majority in Lafferty convinced
their colleagues at the Fourth District Court of Appeal, the Florida
Supreme Court was not persuaded. In reversing the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, the supreme court adopted the minority
118. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
119. Pasakarnis, 425 So. 2d at 1144-45 (Schwartz, J., dissenting). Judge Schwartz
pointed out that no statute has been enacted which specifically prohibits nonuse of seat
belts from being considered evidence in the mitigation of damages. He opined, "Florida's
silence on the issue may therefore be taken, not as a declaration that the defense may not be
recognized, but rather as one that the issue 'should be determined within judicial process."
Id. at 1145.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1146.
122. Id. This idea is troublesome. The jury does not have the benefit of time to decide
by way of technical evidence in the form of expert testimony and literature to make a fair
decision. See Lafferty, 425 So. 2d at 1149 (court asserted that "[a] jury should not find the
existence or nonexistence of a legal duty to use a belt based upon such traditionally legisla-
tive materials").
123. Pasakarnis, 425 So. 2d at 1147 (Schwartz, J., dissenting). This view of the need for
competent evidence is generally shared by those in favor of the seat belt defense.
124. Id.; Lafferty, 425 So. 2d at 1151 (Hurley, J., dissenting).
1984]
686 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:669
view and held that evidence of seat belt nonuse is admissible to
show enhanced injuries.125
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Alderman, writing for the majority, noted early in his
opinion that although the seat belt issue had been raised in several
district courts of appeal, these courts had not considered the de-
fense under any of the possible theories because the evidence had
not established that the injuries would have been prevented or
lessened by the use of a seat belt. e12  He then proceeded through a
brief summation of Brown v. Kendrick 2 7 and its progeny 128 to il-
lustrate that those cases, unlike the Pasakarnis case, did not pro-
vide sufficient evidence to establish that the nonuse of seat belts
increased the injuries.12
The supreme court rejected the argument that the courts are law
interpreting and not lawmaking1'" and, therefore, should exercise
judicial restraint when called upon to adopt the seat belt de-
fense. 31 The court cited Hoffman v. Jones for the proposition that
the court should not abdicate to the legislature its responsibility to
ensure that the law remain "fair and realistic as society and tech-
nology change." 132
Additionally, the majority in Pasakarnis cited Auburn Machine
125. Insurance Co. of N. America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984); see Note,
supra note 57, at 117.
126. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 450.
127. 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966).
128. Selfe v. Smith, 397 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (court held that no duty existed
requiring parents to install child restraint devices in their vehicles; therefore, a jury could
not impose contribution or liability on parents) (recently the legislature passed FLA. STAT. §
316.613 (1983), requiring child restraints but including a section prohibiting nonuse of child
restraints from being admitted into evidence in a civil action); Quinn v. Millard, 358 So. 2d
1378, 1384-85 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (court refused to rule on the seat belt issue because the
evidence did not support the contention that the plaintiff intentionally exposed himself to
known risks, nor did the defendant provide any evidence that fewer injuries would have
resulted had the seat belt been worn); Chandler Leasing Corp. v. Gibson, 227 So. 2d 889, 890
(Fla. 3d DCA 1969) (court found that the defendant did not plead contributory negligence
and therefore the evidence was correctly precluded from the jury; court in dictum stated
that even if defendants had properly attempted to raise the issue of contributory negligence,
they still would have had to face Brown).
129. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 450.
130. Id. at 451. But see infra note 150 and accompanying text.
131. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 451.
132. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 436 (Fla. 1973). In Hoffman, the court decided
that a complete bar to the plaintiff's recovery because of his contributory negligence was
inequitable and therefore judicially adopted comparative negligence.
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Works v. Jones,133 in which the supreme court held that the obvi-
ousness of the hazard was not an exception to the manufacturer's
liability but rather a defense whereby the manufacturer could
show that the plaintiff had not used the reasonable degree of care
required under the circumstances.
Moving closer to the issue of automobile usage, the supreme
court drew further support from their past holding in Ford Motor
Co. v. Evancho13 4 "that there was a duty of care resting on com-
mon law negligence that the manufacturer of an article must use
reasonable care in design and manufacture of its product to elimi-
nate the risk of foreseeable injury. "135 The supreme court held that
the foreseeability issue as construed in Evancho was relevant to
the Pasakarnis case. 3 ' The court came to what it considered the
logical conclusion-that if accident injuries are foreseeable to man-
ufacturers, then they are also foreseeable to the motorist.137
The court relied on the fact that "[tjhe seat belt has been
proven to afford the occupant of an automobile a means whereby
he or she may minimize his or her personal damages prior to the
occurrence of the accident.' 3s In support, the court offered a 1982
study which concluded that the effectiveness of seat belts in reduc-
ing injury and death is "substantial and unequivocal."'3 9 From this
determination, the court concluded that failure to wear the safety
belt may, under certain circumstances, be a factor for the jury to
consider in deciding whether the plaintiff exercised due care for his
own safety.' 40
The supreme court adopted the approach set out in Spier v.
133. 366 So. 2d 1167, 1171 (Fla. 1979).
134. 327 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976).
135. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 452 (citing Evancho, 327 So. 2d at 204).
136. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 452. Quoting Evancho, 327 So. 2d at 204, the court
asserted:
Automobiles are made for use on the roads and highways in transporting persons
and cargo to and from various points. This intended use cannot be carried out
without encountering in varying degrees the statistically proved hazard of injury-
producing impacts of various types ....
...While automobiles are not made for the purpose of colliding with each
other, a frequent and inevitable contingency of normal automobile use will result
in collisions and injury-producing impacts.
137. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 453.
138. Id. (citing Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 1974)).
139. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 451 (citing NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF SAFETY BELT AND CHILD RESTRAINT
USAGE (1982)).
140. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 451.
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Barker14 and outlined by Judge Schwartz's dissent. 4 2
Nonuse of the seat belt may or may not amount to a failure to use
reasonable care on the part of the plaintiff. Whether it does de-
pends on the particular circumstances of the case. Defendant has
the burden of pleading and proving that the plaintiff did not use
an available and operational seat belt, that the plaintiff's failure
to use the seat belt was unreasonable under the circumstances,
and that there was a causal relationship between the injuries sus-
tained by the plaintiff and plaintiffs failure to buckle up. 4 3
Moreover, if there is competent evidence establishing these factors,
the jury will be permitted to consider those factors in deciding
whether the damages to the plaintiff should be reduced.1 4
In an attempt to eliminate jury confusion, the court authorized
the addition of three new interrogatories to the standard verdict
form. 45 The first inquiry is whether the plaintiff acted reasonably
by not wearing a seat belt.146 Second, the jury is to determine
whether there was sufficient proof that the failure to use the belt
contributed to the injuries.147 The third question requires the jury
to determine the percentage of injuries resulting from seat belt
nonuse.1
48
B. Analysis of the Majority Opinion
The rationale of the majority in Pasakarnis is suspect for several
reasons. As previously noted, the Florida Supreme Court cited
Hoffman v. Jones19 for the proposition that the court can alter
existing law absent legislation. 150 Moreover, the court held that the
141. 323 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 1974).
142. Pasakarnis, 425 So. 2d at 1142 (Schwartz, J., dissenting).
143. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 454.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. "(a) Did defendant prove that the plaintiff failed to use reasonable care under the
circumstances by failing to use an available and fully operational seat belt?" Id. Instructions
provide that if the answer is no, the jury should not proceed to the next question.
147. "(b) Did defendant prove that plaintiff's failure to use an available and fully oper-
ational seat belt produced or contributed substantially to producing at least a portion of the
plaintiff's damages?" Id. Some instructions are provided.
148. "(c) What percentage of plaintiff's total damages were caused by his (or her) fail-
ure to use an available and fully operational seat belt?" Id.
149. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
150. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 451. But see Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d
913, 925 (Fla. 1978), where the Florida Supreme Court held:
Accordingly, until the provisions of Article II, Section 3, of the Florida Constitu-
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seat belt defense was consistent with the doctrine of comparative
negligence as adopted in Hoffman.'
A careful look reveals that the court's reliance on the Hoffman
decision is misplaced in the context of the seat belt defense. Prior
to Hoffman, the plaintiff was totally barred from recovery in a
wrongful death action due to his limited negligence in causing the
accident. 152 The court rebutted the judicial restraint argument
with the notion that the court "may change the rule where great
social upheaval dictates."' 63 The Hoffman court recognized that it
was almost universally considered unjust and inequitable to vest
an entire accidental loss on one of the parties whose negligence
when combined with the negligence of the other party produced
the loss.'6 4 Additionally, the court in Hoffman noted that if fault
were to be the test of liability, the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence, which involves apportionment of loss among those whose
fault contributed to the occurrence, would be more consistent with
liability based on fault.155
In contrast, in Pasakarnis there was no indication of any great
social upheaval. Quite to the contrary, a low percentage of motor-
ists use seat belts.1 56 Unlike the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence, the seat belt defense is the minority view.' 57 Since there is
so much controversy concerning the effectiveness of the seat belt
and a great deal of judicial agonizing over the inequities of both
positions, judicial restraint could hardly be considered as unjust or
inequitable.
Equally troubling is the supreme court's use of Hoffman v. Jones
tion are altered by the people, we deem the doctrine of nondelegation of legislative
power to be viable in this state. Under this doctrine fundamental and primary
policy decisions shall be made by members of the legislature who are elected to
perform those tasks, and administration of legislative programs must be pursuant
to some minimal standards and guidelines ascertainable by reference to the enact-
ment establishing the program.
151. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 452-53.
152. Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 432.
153. Id. at 435.
154. Id. at 436.
155. Id. This statement reveals that the court was thinking in terms of the cause of the
accident as opposed to the injuries. Generally, the cause of the accident is in fact the cause
of the injuries, so the court probably did not deem it necessary to express this distinction.
156. Justice Shaw noted in his dissent that only 14% of the motorists used their seat
belt in the first half of 1983. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 455 (Shaw, J., dissenting) (citing
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., PROGRESS AND ASSESS-
MENT REPORT ON THE NATIONAL SAFETY BELT USAGE PROGRAM (Sept. 1983)).
157. See Note, supra note 57, at 133.
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as a springboard to invade areas of tort law.158 There are some ar-
eas where judicial intervention is inappropriate. Unlike Hoffman,
the court in Pasakarnis was required to evaluate volumes of stud-
ies and surveys of automobile safety to make its decision.1 59 Due to
the court's limited resources, this has traditionally been a legisla-
tive task. Consequently, the court in Pasakarnis effectively erased
the line that has separated the judiciary from the legislative
branch.
It is unclear why the court felt compelled to emphasize the doc-
trine of comparative negligence as a basis for its decision. The su-
preme court noted that the seat belt defense was consistent with
"the underlying philosophy of individual responsibility upon which
the decisions of this Court succeeding Hoffman have been predi-
cated."16 0 However, several factors reveal that Florida's switch to
comparative negligence has little significance with respect to the
seat belt defense. First, the court in Pasakarnis adopted the ra-
tionale of the New York case, Spier v. Barker.'6 1 At the time Spier
was decided, New York was a contributory negligence jurisdiction.
Thus, if Florida was still a contributory negligence state, the same
result could have been reached. Contrary to the position of the pe-
titioner,1 6 2 there was no indication in Brown v. Kendrick"6 3 that
the court considered the harshness of contributory negligence. Sec-
ond, the Brown court could have applied the concept of remote
contributory negligence, which has been defined as "that negli-
gence which is too far removed as to time or place, or causative
force, to be a direct or proximate cause of the accident.' 61 4 If the
plaintiff's negligence was remote, it would be considered in mitiga-
tion of damages, rather than as a bar to his recovery.6 5 Third, the
158. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 451. The supreme court asserted, "[T]he law of torts in
Florida has been modernized, for the most part, through the courts."
159. In addition to the studies cited in the majority and dissenting opinions in
Pasakarnis, amicus curiae briefs submitted by the Florida Safety Councils and the Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., included appendices which
contained detailed traffic accident statistics and automobile safety data.
160. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 451.
161. 323 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 1974). In Spier, evidence of seat belt nonuse went to the
mitigation of damages under the theory of avoidable consequences, not to the issue of com-
parative or contributory negligence.
162. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 4, Insurance Co. of N. America v. Pasakarnis, 451
So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984).
163. 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966).
164. Street v. Calvert, 541 S.W.2d 576, 585 (Tenn. 1976).
165. See Perry v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 502 F.2d 1144, 1145 (6th Cir. 1974); Frank-
enberg v. Southern Ry., 424 F.2d 507, 508 (6th Cir. 1970); Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Smith,
264 F.2d 428, 432 (6th Cir. 1959); Street v. Calvert, 541 S.W.2d 576, 585 (Tenn. 1976).
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Florida Supreme Court soundly rejected the theory premised on
negligence, reasoning that this theory would be applicable only if a
plaintiff's failure to use due care contributed to the accident rather
than to the injuries. '66
The court cited Auburn Machine Works Co. v. Jones"6 7 to illus-
trate how the doctrine of comparative negligence can affect com-
mon law tort concepts. In Auburn, the court prevented the manu-
facturer from escaping liability by rejecting the "patent danger"
doctrine.'6 8 The court in Pasakarnis also cited Ford Motor Co. v.
Evancho'69 for the proposition that automobile manufacturers may
be held liable for a design or manufacturing defect that enhances
injuries during a car accident.'7 ° Furthermore, the court held that
automobile accidents and resulting injuries were foreseeable, a
point the court found particularly relevant to the present case.'71
Several reasons not expressed by the supreme court, however,
distinguish these previous manufacturer cases from the present
case and therefore makes reliance on these cases inappropriate.
Unlike Pasakarnis, which dealt with an individual tortfeasor, the
manufacturer cases relied on by the court in support of the fore-
seeability of the injuries dealt with great numbers of items gener-
ally associated with mass production. When dealing in the volume
of cars manufactured by Ford, an auto accident is not only foresee-
able, but there is a probable certainty that a given number of
automobiles will be involved in accidents.'72 The substantial num-
ber of cars manufactured increases the risk of injuries proportion-
ately. Courts have long recognized a higher standard of care for
manufacturers in products liability cases inasmuch as they place
the chattel in the stream of commerce with the intent of profiting
from the consumer.' 73 Applying Judge Learned Hand's formula'74
for determining liability and taking into account the profit margin
166. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 453-54.
167. 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1979).
168. The doctrine was considered to be an exception to the manufacturer's liability due
to the obviousness of the hazard. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 452. The court rejected the
doctrine as an exception to liability but allowed the doctrine as a defense where the manu-
facturer could show unreasonable care. Auburn Machine Works, 366 So. 2d at 1172.
169. 327 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976).
170. The court recognized that the automobile manufacturer has a greater ability than
the driver to safeguard against injuries resulting from automobile collisions. Pasakarnis, 451
So. 2d at 452.
171. Id.
172. See Evancho, 327 So. 2d at 203.
173. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
174. See supra text accompanying note 59.
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due to sales, the burden to design and manufacture a safe automo-
bile is slight compared to the probable certainty of the accident. 175
In contrast, a motorist who complies with highway speed limits
and traffic rules has only a relatively small chance of being in-
volved in an accident.176 To some motorists, the burden of con-
sciously buckling a seat belt every time the motorist enters a car
may seem great compared to the probability of an accident. 7 7
The supreme court determined that the seat belt provided mo-
torists with a means to minimize his or her personal injuries prior
to an accident.178 In support, the court offered a 1982 study by the
United States Department of Transportation, which indicated that
evidence of the effectiveness of safety belts in reducing injury and
death is substantial and unequivocal.179 The court, however, did
not consider the possibility that the use of seat belts may actually
enhance injury or even prove fatal in a particular accident. In a
recent case, McLeod v. American Motors Corp.,'80 an expert wit-
ness testified that had the plaintiff been wearing her seat belt, she
would have received greater injuries. This case suggests that, in
some instances, buckling one's seat belt may result in more serious
injuries. The majority's holding in Pasakarnis will force the motor-
ist to make predictions as to what might occur. To impose a less
than absolute duty to wear seat belts requires a motorist to predict
an outcome that may or may not be beneficial to his health.' In
deciding Lafferty, the Fourth District Court of Appeal recognized
175. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 452. The court implied that the auto manufacturer has a
greater duty of care than the motorist "[b]ecause of the greater ability of the manufacturer
to safeguard against injuries in automobile collision cases . Id.
176. Miller v. Miller, 160 S.E.2d 65, 69 (N.C. 1968).
177. In Miller, 160 S.E.2d at 69, the court noted that most motorists reach their destina-
tion safely and that a typical automobile occupant believes that he "need not truss himself
up in every known safety apparatus before proceeding on the highway."
178. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 453.
179. Id. (citing NATIONAL HIGHWAY SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., EFFECTIVE-
NESS AND EFFICIENCY OF SAFETY BELT AND CHILD RESTRAINT USAGE (1982)).
180. 723 F.2d 830, 836 (11th Cir. 1984).
181. The court in Lafferty was trapped by this halfway approach. Quoting Petersen v.
Klos, 426 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir. 1970), the court noted:
Yet another problem was recognized by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in
Miller v. Miller .... The court observed that, excluding the most bizarre circum-
stances, "there are no standards by which it can be said that the use of seat belts
is required for one trip and not for another," since a motorist ordinarily must
engage the seat belts before the imminent danger of an accident is apparent. If a
duty to use seat belts is recognized, it must then be an absolute duty, not depen-
dent on the circumstances of a particular accident.
Lafferty v. Allstate Ins. Co., 425 So. 2d 1147, 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (citation omitted),
rev'd, 451 So. 2d 446 (1984).
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this dilemma, asserting that "[e]vidence of enhanced injuries from
no seat belt is hindsight." ' 2
Equally disturbing is the fact that the Florida Supreme Court
did not respond to the concept raised in Lafferty "that a tortfeasor
takes his plaintiff as he finds him."18 The holding in Pasakarnis
may very well lead to subsequent litigation concerning other preac-
cident behavior of the plaintiff, whereas a usual mitigation of dam-
ages analysis would only consider post-accident behavior. For ex-
ample, will the court now consider the increased risk of heart
failure due to smoking to be a precipitating factor of a fatal heart
attack following an accident? To date, no court has accepted this
physical abuse as a viable defense." 4 This is analogous to the seat
belt defense. In both instances, it has been determined that the
prior habits of the plaintiff could prove detrimental to the individ-
ual's health. The acceptance of the seat belt defense could generate
many litigable questions as to what constitutes a breach of due
care or a failure to mitigate damages in other contexts as well.
C. The Dissent
Justice Shaw, with whom Justice Adkins concurred, strenuously
dissented from the majority's holding. 8 He began his analysis by
noting that the majority's opinion ignored the fact that the legisla-
ture had recently prohibited the theories of comparative negligence
or mitigation of damages to be considered when a parent or legal
guardian had not provided and used a child restraint.8 Although
the use of a child restraint is now mandated by law, admission of
evidence of nonuse of a child restraint is statutorily prohibited.'
Justice Shaw argued that the child restraint situation was analo-
gous to the seat belt issue. "It seems to me that there would be a
greater duty for a parent to protect a helpless child, especially
when required by law, than to protect himself."'8 8
The dissenters also noted that the majority of the motoring pub-
182. Lafferty, 425 So. 2d at 1149.
183. Id. at 1150.
184. A similar situation occurred in Matthews v. Williford, 318 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2d DCA
1975). The decedent had been advised by his doctor to quit smoking and lose weight. He
subsequently suffered a heart attack and died. In response to the suit alleging improper
medical care, the doctor unsuccessfully asserted that the decedent's prior conduct should be
admissible to show contributory negligence.
185. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 455 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
186. Id. Justice Shaw was referring to FLA. STAT. § 316.613(1), (3) (1983).
187. FLA. STAT. § 316.613(3) (1983).
188. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 455 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
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lic do not use seat belts and that there is no common law or statu-
tory duty requiring their use. Consequently, they advanced the no-
tion that the legislature was the appropriate forum in which to
settle this issue. 8 9
Justice Shaw was also troubled by the majority's misuse of the
doctrine of avoidable consequences. Since this doctrine is generally
applied to post-accident conduct, the failure to buckle one's seat
belt does not fall within the normal bounds of this principle. Jus-
tice Shaw asserted: "The majority's defense therefore not only
smacks of judicial policy making, but also offends traditional no-
tions of tort law." 190
Additionally, Justice Shaw argued that the adoption of the seat
belt defense would increase the cost, time, and complexity of litiga-
tion. 191 First, he predicted difficulty for the jury having to evaluate
conflicting testimony on such technical elements of crash behav-
ior."'92 As a result, Shaw thought the seat belt issue might become
the focal point and completely overshadow the tortfeasor's conduct
that caused the accident.' Second, he recognized practical and
technical difficulties that would result from the court's decision.
For instance, when does the duty to wear a seat belt arise, and who
must wear it?194 In conclusion, he considered the adoption of the
seat belt defense "an unwarranted and inappropriate use of judi-
cial power to impose by fiat a debatable public policy on an unwill-
ing public."' 95
V. SUGGESTED LEGISLATIVE ACTION
The widespread use of automobiles, the number of accidents
189. Id. at 456.
190. Id.
191. He stated: "It is unclear in my mind when the defense is available and when the
duty to wear seat belts arises. Is it available in an intentional tort action? What is the duty
of a pregnant or handicapped person to wear the safety device?" Id.
192. He noted:
The jury will be called upon to evaluate conflicting expert testimony on such tech-
nical elements as the crash behavior of the vehicle, the trajectory of the plaintiff's
body in the crash, the relationship of the vehicle crash event to occupant kinemat-
ics, the particular injury suffered, the trajectory which a restrained occupant
would have taken, and the extent of lesser injuries which the restrained occupant




195. Id. at 457.
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that occur,' 6 and the conflicting views as to the effectiveness and
use of the seat belt, make the seat belt defense a good candidate
for legislative consideration. Moreover, the judiciary lacks both the
resources and the time to adequately resolve this public policy
issue.
The Florida legislature has two options. First, if the legislature
determines through its committees that the seat belt is an effective
device in most instances but that there is an element of risk in its
use, it can draft a statute that precludes the use of evidence of seat
belt nonuse in personal injury trials."9 7 This has already been es-
tablished by other legislatures." 8
New York has blazed the legislative trail through their recent
enactment of a statute requiring that seat belts be worn. e'9 The
statute provides that all front seat passengers are to be restrained
by seat belts while the motor vehicle is in operation, 00 and also
requires that the operator of the motor vehicle be restrained by a
safety belt.20' Violators may be fined up to fifty dollars. 2  The
statute does not apply to physically disabled individuals who are
unable to wear a seat belt.20 3 The statute also provides that evi-
dence of noncompliance can be used to mitigate damages if pled as
an affirmative defense, although noncompliance is not admissible
as evidence in regard to the issue of liability.2 0 4
If a seat belt is to be required as a matter of public policy, legis-
lative mandate is the more appropriate vehicle. New York motor-
ists are likely to be more aware than Florida motorists of the duty
196. 47,400 people were killed in automobile accidents in the United States in 1980,
while 1,400,000 others were severely injured. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 40
(1981).
197. Virginia has a statute that expressly precludes evidence of seat belt nonuse in civil
actions. VA. CODE § 46.1-309.1 (Supp. 1984). The pertinent part provides: "Failure to use
such safety lap belts or a combination of lap belts and shoulder straps or harnesses after
installation shall not be deemed to be negligence nor shall evidence of such nonuse of such
devices be considered in mitigation of damages of whatever nature."
198. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.445 (West Supp. 1984) (use or nonuse of seat belts not
admissible in civil actions for damages); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1368-A (1978) (non-
use of seat belts not admissible in any trial resulting from an accident); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
169.685(4) (West Supp. 1984) (proof of nonuse of seat belts inadmissible in any trial for
personal injuries or property damages); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-9-214(a) (1980) (in no event
shall nonuse of seat belts be contributory negligence or be considered to mitigate damages).
199. Ch. 365, 1984 N.Y. Sess. Law News 689 (McKinney).
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imposed and the consequences for failure to comply. °5
Once making the determination that mandatory seat belt use is
appropriate, the Florida legislature should follow the example of
New York and impose a fine on motorists who fail to comply. Fines
generally increase the probability of lawful compliance.2"6 Another
section should address the applicability of the statute in accident
litigation. The Florida law should contain an express proviso that
negligence would not affect liability, but would be considered to
mitigate damages. Failure to comply, therefore, would not be con-
sidered negligence per se.20 7
It can be anticipated that a mandatory seat belt law will be con-
stitutionally challenged in court. The arguments will probably be
based on grounds of an unwarranted intrusion on privacy and re-
striction on individual freedom. Similar arguments were advanced
when the laws requiring the use of motorcycle helmets went into
effect.20 ' The courts faced with these arguments have stated: "[W]e
believe that society has an interest in the preservation of the life of
the individual for his own sake."20 9 The Florida Supreme Court
held, in a motorcycle helmet case, that a minimal inconvenience
could be imposed by the legislature to protect against a significant
possibility of serious injury or death.21 0 The controversy that exists
as to the effectiveness of the use of seat belt and its potential to
increase injuries may distinguish it from the motorcycle helmet
law. Notwithstanding this issue of debatable public welfare, if the
legislature decides that the risk of enhanced injuries is very slight
when compared with its ability to prevent injuries, the statute will
205. The statute mandates educational programs by the Governor's Traffic Safety Com-
mittee as well as law enforcement assistance. Id. §§ 3-4, 1984 N.Y. Sess. Law News at 690.
206. See Note, supra note 57, at 151 (citing G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); P. Pellerin & K. Heine, Special Report: Seat Belt
Use Abroad 1 (unpublished report prepared for the American Seat Belt Council, Jan.
1978)).
207. See Rex Utils., Inc. v. Gaddy, 413 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). A similar argu-
ment arose in this case, where it was asserted that failure to wear a motorcycle helmet
constituted negligence per se. The court rejected this notion by asserting: "It does not follow
...that a violation of this type of statute by itself constitutes a case of actionable negli-
gence." Id. at 1234.
208. See Comment, Constitutionality of Mandatory Motorcycle Helmet Legislation, 73
DICK. L. REV. 100 (1968); Note, Motorcycle Helmets and the Constitutionality of Self-Pro-
tective Legislation, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 355 (1969).
209. State v. Eitel, 227 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla. 1969) (supreme court held that law mandat-
ing motorcycle headgear is constitutional).
210. Id. Eitel was reaffirmed in Hamm v. State, 387 So. 2d 946, 947 (Fla. 1980). See also
Comment, supra note 25, at 134 (discussion of constitutional challenges to motorcycle hel-
met statute in Tennessee).
SEAT BELT DEFENSE
more than likely pass constitutional muster.
Although commentators have indicated that the members of the
public will probably not change their habits as a result of the law,
an examination of countries abroad proves otherwise.211 Australia
in 1971 and France in 1973 enacted such laws and reported that
use increased from 25% to an average of 75-80% with a concurrent
decline in fatalities.2 12 If an objective is ultimately set to encourage
seat belt use, a legislative mandate will help insure Florida the
same success. More importantly, to encourage the use of seat belts
and to fairly apprise the Florida motorist of this new duty imposed
by legislative action, a widespread and thorough educational pro-
gram utilizing the mass media and law enforcement agencies
should be launched to inform the public of the advantages of using
seat belts and of the law that requires their use.
VI. CONCLUSION
The number of automobile accidents and resulting injuries and
deaths each year makes the issue of seat belt usage quite impor-
tant. Feeling compelled to assist in ending this carnage, the Florida
Supreme Court in Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis
took it upon itself to impose an unsure duty to wear seat belts. The
court was obviously attempting to encourage the use of seat belts
and aid in the equitable apportionment of damages. However, sev-
eral factors suggest this decision was inappropriate and at the very
least premature.
First, the issue of seat belt effectiveness and public acceptance is
both complex and technical. Many questions remain in the minds
of the motoring public and judges throughout the state as to the
effectiveness of the seat belt and the inequities that may result if
the seat belt defense is adopted. These substantial reservations
concerning the effectiveness of seat belts and the scope of the seat
belt defense should not be disregarded. Moreover, the small per-
centage of seat belt users lends support to the notion that the pub-
lic is not yet consciously aware of the advantages of the use of the
seat belt.
211. See Note, supra note 57, at 103 n.84 (noting that 22 countries or regions currently
mandate seat belt use; these include: Australia; Austria; Belgium; British Columbia, Onta-
rio, Quebec, and Saskatchewan, Canada; Czechoslovakia; Denmark; Finland; France; Israel;
Luxembourg; The Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Puerto Rico; Spain; Sweden; Swit-
zerland; The Soviet Union; and West Germany).
212. See Comment, supra note 25, at 133 (citing NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, TRAFFIC
ACCIDENT FACTS 52 (1975)).
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Second, the supreme court's failure to respond to the concept
that you "take your plaintiff as you find him" blurs the line that
has been drawn regarding preaccident conduct. Furthermore, the
supreme court's use of the doctrine of avoidable consequences in
reference to preaccident conduct, as opposed to the traditional
post-accident applications, adds further confusion to an estab-
lished tort doctrine.
Third, as a practical matter, the adoption of the seat belt de-
fense as written leaves many questions unanswered regarding its
application. 213 Because there is no absolute duty to wear a seat
belt, under what circumstances should the motorist wear them?
Even more troubling, how will the jury know when the duty arises?
The language of the opinion indicates that the seat belt must be
"available and fully operational. ' 21' Does that imply a duty to
keep the seat belts operational? How long can they be in disrepair?
What if the motorist consciously removes them from the vehicle?
Another consideration is the practicality of hiring an expert to
testify as to the causal connection between the failure to fasten the
seat belt and the injuries. Even though the defendant may win the
battle of the experts, there is little assurance that the jury will find
that the plaintiff acted unreasonably. It is all too apparent that the
court could not establish in its own mind the utility of the seat belt
and therefore passed the decision on to the jury. Unfortunately,
the jury is without the benefit of nonpartisan evidence to make its
decision.
All factors considered, the adoption of the seat belt defense is
inappropriate for judicial resolution. Until such time as the legisla-
ture determines that public policy demands the use of seat belts,21 5
the unwary motorist should not be denied recovery for those inju-
ries that may have been prevented by use of seat belts. Since the
213. The Florida Supreme Court has recently attempted to clarify at least one of these
issues. In Protective Cas. Ins. Co. v. Killane, 9 Fla. L.W. 490 (Fla. Nov. 29, 1984), the court
stated that the seat belt defense must be "specifically pled" prior to trial; the court seemed
to be concerned with the potential prejudice which could occur to the plaintiff if the
defendent did not raise the defense until during or shortly before the trial.
214. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 454.
215. At the time that this note went to print, three bills that would require seat belt
usage had been prefiled with the Florida House of Representatives for the 1985 legislative
session. Fla. HB's 37, 47 & 70 (1985). Although the provisions and requirements of these
bills differ somewhat, all of the bills provide that violation of the law would be a noncrimi-
nal traffic infraction punishable by a fine. House Bills 37 and 70 also provide for public
education programs. However, none of the bills address the question of whether evidence of
nonuse of a seat belt would be admissible in a civil trial on the issues of negligence and
mitigation of damages.
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decision will ultimately affect the Florida motorist, it follows that
fairness dictates that the motorist be fully apprised. When and if
the legislature determines that seat belts should be worn, and if
the legislature determines that the nonuse of seat belts should be
admissible on the issue of mitigation of damages, its determination
must be accompanied by a widespread campaign urging the motor-
ist to "buckle up" and informing him of the physical and financial
consequences he may suffer if he fails to do so.
M. DAVID SHAPIRO

